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| == Expertise Literature: Characteristics of Expert Performance == Gary A. Klein의 연구 중에서. It is important to consider the nature of expertise if one is to conduct a successful Cognitive Task Analysis. In developing Cognitive Task Analysis techniques, it is important to consider what types of information are being sought and how they are likely to be stored. This section contains excerpts from the expertise literature which have influenced out thinking in developing the ACTA techniques. === Nature of expertise. === Shanteau (1985) has distinguished between perceptual expertise (e.g., soil judgements, wine tasting) and conceptual expertise (e.g., bridge playing). This distinction seems to work fairly well. If a domain does not require any expertise, then it is not an appropriate subject for Cognitive Task Analysis. That is, if skill does not continue to grow for a period of several years, sometimes as long as 10 years, sometimes throughout a Subject Matter Expert’s (SMEs) entire career, then the task is primarily procedural and the cost of Cognitive Task Analysis is not warranted. === Expertise is domain specific. === Experts tend to be experts only in their own domains of expertise. The reason for excellence in their own domain is vast domain-specific knowledge. This has been found in studies of medical diagnosis (Johnson al., 1981), and taxi drivers’ route knowledge (Chase, 1983). === Experts perceive patterns. === Experts perceive large meaningful patterns, or chunks of information, rather than individual pieces of information. This is proposed to be reflection on the organization of the knowledge base from a refined sense of typicality though experience. For example, the "perceptual" advantage in this view is proposed not to reside in a difference in knowledge base, per se, between the expert and the novice, but in the expert’s ability to “see to invisible,” or perceive when something that is expected to be there is missing. === Experts are faster and make fewer errors. === Experts are also proposed to be able to perform more efficiently, consistently, and with committing fewer errors than novice performers. This is demonstrated in the ability of chess players while playing “lightening chess” with tight time constraints per move (Cadenvood, Kelin, & Crandall, 1988). This ability is proposed to be due to the skill being learned to automaticity, where the expert does not have to analyze a situation to perform well. For example, while driving a car one is able to do so very proficiently with adequate mental resources to carry on a conversation and listen to the radio, because the skill of driving is automatic. A further possible reason is that the expert does not have to conduct extensive search for response options due to a vast library of learned response to typical conditions (condition-action rules). === Experts have superior memory in their domain. === Another finding is that experts have superior long- and short-term memory in their areas of expertise (Chase & Ericsson, 1982). This advantage has been ascribed to various mechanisms. One is chunking. The information is said to be stored in meaningful patterns or chunks rather than in terms of individual pieces of information. This means that the expert can recall more than the novice. Also, the chunks of information are integrated into a richer more meaningful knowledge base which aids recall in both the long- and short-term. A further theory puts the power of the expert’s memory not in the head of the expert but in the environmental constraints imposed by the task domain, in terms of the physical environment and the rules that govern it. The expert is attuned to the goal-relevant constraints in the environment and thus the information can be recalled according to, or with respect to, those constraints (Vicente & Wang, in press). This provides a mechanism for recall that allows the expert to store and retrieve the information in meaningful chunks based on the rules and constraints that govern the task. The environmental conditions are an external aid to recall. === Experts see and represent a problem at a deeper level. === Novices in a domain tend to represent problems at a more superficial level, based on surface features of a problem, and on learned rules, as opposed to thinking about a problem at a deeper level. Experience provides the experts with the domain knowledge, patterns, and context that make the world meaningful to them at a causal level. For example, when asked to sort physics problems into categories, novices used literal objects stated in the problem description to sort the problems; whereas, experts used principles of mechanics to organize the problems (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981). === Experts spend more time trying to understand the problem. === This process involves building a mental representation of the problem from which relations that define the situation can be inferred. Constraints to the problem can then be added, defining the boundaries on action. This is in contrast to the novice who jumps right in and begins to manipulate the surface features of the problem. An understanding of the problem often leads to a more efficient path to the solution without being sidetracked by irrelevant information and without following fruitless courses of action. The importance of situation awareness and problem definition is a central theme for understanding expert decision making in real-world contexts. === Experts have strong self-monitoring skills. === Experts have an ability to catch themselves when they make errors. They know why they cannot understand a problem, and they know when to check their solution. Novices, on the other hand, do not have the ability to realize their own limitations, and do not have a refined enough sense of what a typical solution looks like to be able to check themselves before pursuing a false line of action or reasoning. === Experts have refined perceptual abilities. === This perceptual advantage that the expert has developed exists at three levels according to Klein and Hoffman (1993): the ability to see typicality, the ability to see distinctions, and the ability to see antecedents and consequences (through story building and mental simulation). It is assumed that in order for these abilities to work for the expert, an extensive knowledge base has accrued through years of experience. The assertion is not that the less experienced, journeyman performer does not attempt to use these abilities, it is more that, in the expert, these abilities are more finely attuned based on a greater number of past experiences on which to draw. === The ability to see typicality. === There is no way for a novice to judge what is normal and what is an exception (Chi, Hutchinson, & Robin, 1988). In studies with expert firefighters, Klein, Calderwood, and Clinton-Cirocco (1986) found that the rapid size-up of a situation is facilitated by judging typicality of the situation which evokes several types of knowledge: recognizing relevant cues, recognizing events that are expected, recognizing plausible goals, and recognizing feasible courses of action. This ability allows the expert decision makers to direct their actions and avoid wasting efforts by seeing which goals are feasible given the situation. They are able to avoid being overwhelmed by a flood of information by focusing on the relevant cues. They are able to recognize when a situation assessment or course of action was incorrect based on their anticipation of expected events and a recognition of when those expectancies are violated. They are also able to respond rapidly based on a recognition of the typical course of action, which also means that experts are able to perform proficiently under intense time pressure (Calderwood, Klein, & Crandall, 1988). === The ability to see distinctions. === Experts are particularly good at making fine discriminations, compared to the performance of the novice or journeyman. Good examples of this occur particularly in competitions where expert judges are either required to judge performance at a task, such as high diving or gymnastics, or judge some attribute of a particular item, such as prize dogs, or watermelons. The inexperienced audience member is left wondering what it was about the winning dive A, bull X, or watermelon Z that distinguished them from the rest of the competition. This ability to distinguish subtle, but functionally important and relevant, differences between two or more similar cues or pieces of information is a skill that is acquired through active participation in a domain for many years. For more on this topic the reader is referred to the work of Shanteau (Shanteau, 1985; Phelps & Shanteau, 1978). === The ability to see antecedents and conseauences. === Experts are able to build a story to explain how a situation arose and to mentally simulate how the situation will develop, or how a course of action may be played through. This ability is based on the ability to perceive typicality and resemblances to many past experiences. It also relies on the subsequent ability to generate expectancies in terms of what will happen if one chooses to follow a particular course of action. In terms of playing through a particular course of action, the experts may predict whether the course of action will have a satisfactory outcome. If the outcome is not satisfactory, the experts can see where they might trip up. This may occur because of a realization that the initial assessment was incorrect in some way, which will be highlighted by the mental simulation, or because the course of action will have consequences for the development of the situation, which may call for an alternate subsequent course of action. This mental simulation of a course of action has been likened to the idea of “progressive deepening” used by chess masters to play out a sequence of moves and the opponents’ likely responise (de Groot, 1946/1978). For more about the functions of mental simulation in skilled performance see Klein and Crandall (1995). With specific reference to characteristics of expertise in decision-making, Shanteau (1987) presented fourteen characteristics that differentiated the decision making abilities of experts from those of novices. Briefly these include: highly developed perceptual and attentional abilities; a sense of what is relevant versus irrelevant; the ability to simplify complex problems, or “make sense out of chaos;” a superior pattern-recognition ability; the ability to communicate their expertise effectively; an ability to identify and react to exceptions to strategies; a strong sense of responsibility in backing their decisions; an ability to pick solvable problems; strong outward confidence; a strong belief in their ability; adaptability and flexibility in their response to situations; extensive and up-to-date content knowledge; automaticity in cognitive processing; a greater tolerance to stress; creativity in finding new decision-making strategies when presented with atypical situations; and an inability to articulate their decision-making processes. These findings have been found to be robust and generalizable across many varied domains (Glaser, 1987). The fact that the research has studied individuals within a rich context, and that individuals only display expertise within their own domains, suggests the importance of the environmental or situational factors and constraints on expertise. |
[[전문성의 특징]] |
전문성
전문성이란 무엇인가?
전문성은 어떻게 계발할 수 있는가?
전문성을 어떻게 가르칠 수 있는가?
전문가에게서 CollaborativeDevelopmentOfExpertise나 AppliedCognitiveTaskAnalysis 등을 사용하여 전문성의 요소를 끄집어낼 수 있고, 그것을 자신이 DeliberatePerformance 등을 통해 훈련함으로써 얻어질 수 있다. DreyfusModel은 전문성의 단계를 설명한다.
ReflectivePractice도 도움이 될 수 있다.
klein-applied cognitive task analysis methodology.pdf